

LOCAL CLIMATE ADAPTIVE LIVING FACILITY Plus (LoCAL+) - West Africa (Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali and Niger)

Conflict sensitivity analysis

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Glossary

Term	Definition
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)	Individuals who are forced to flee their home but remain within their country's borders due to conflict, violence, natural disasters, or human rights violations.
Military Coup	An illegal and overt attempt by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the current government.
Transitional President	A leader appointed or recognized to guide a nation through a transition period, often following a coup or political crisis, until formal elections are held.
Armed Insurrection	A violent uprising against an authority or government, involving armed conflict.
Islamist Militants	Individuals or groups that pursue political objectives under the banner of Islam, often through violent means.
Separatists	Groups or individuals advocating for separation from the larger political entity to form an independent state or gain greater autonomy.
Foreign Mercenaries	Individuals from one country hired to fight in an armed conflict in another country, not part of the official military forces.
Sikasso Region	A geographic area in Mali known for maintaining relative peace and stability amidst broader national turmoil.
Liptako-Gourma Region	A tri-border area intersecting Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, characterized by limited government presence and significant activity by armed groups.
National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP)	The governing body established by the military following a coup in Niger.
Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)	A terrorist organization operating in the Sahel region, affiliated with the Islamic State.
Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (JNIM)	An Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group active in the Sahel, particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso.
Boko Haram	A terrorist group based in northeastern Nigeria, known for violent attacks and kidnappings in the Lake Chad Basin region.
Islamic State in West Africa	A faction of Boko Haram that split and pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, operating in the Lake Chad and Sahel regions.

Province (ISWAP)	
ECOWAS	The Economic Community of West African States, a regional political and economic union of fifteen West African countries.
Alliance of Sahel States (AoSS)	A military bloc formed by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, governed by military regimes, to address regional security and political challenges.
Pastoralism	A form of livestock farming where animals are taken to different locations to graze, common in semi-arid and arid regions.
Conflict Resolution Mechanism	Strategies and processes designed to resolve disputes and conflicts, promoting peace and stability.
Community Engagement Plan	A strategy for involving community members in decision-making processes, ensuring their needs and concerns are addressed.
Security Protocol	A set of guidelines and measures designed to ensure the safety and security of individuals and communities involved in a project or activity.

1. Introduction

The proposed "LOCAL CLIMATE ADAPTIVE LIVING FACILITY Plus+ (LoCAL+) - West Africa (Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali et and Niger) programme aims at promoting climate-resilient communities and the local economies in the four target countries (Fund-level Impact), by empowering local governments and stakeholders with improved access to adaptation finance, knowledge, and know-how to deliver climate-resilient investments. Among these four countries, currently, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali are going through internal and regional conflicts. Compared to Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali, Côte d'Ivoire is experiencing a period of relative political stability.

This report provides an in-depth analysis of the existing conflicts and subsequently carries out a conflict sensitivity analysis in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali. These countries, each with unique complexities, are grappling with political instability that can have profound implications for the proposed GCF programme. Therefore, it is crucial to properly carry out a conflict sensitivity analysis to properly plan future programme implementation.

Niger: On July 26, 2023, Niger witnessed a significant political upheaval when a military coup led to the ousting of President Mohamed Bazoum. The operators of the coup, identifying themselves as the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP), took drastic measures by dissolving the constitution, suspending all political institutions, and closing the nation's borders.¹

This event unfolded against the backdrop of Niger's longstanding struggle with Islamist armed groups. Groups such as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Al-Qaeda-linked Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (JNIM), Boko Haram, and the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) have been active in both the western and southeastern regions of Niger.² The conflict has been devastating, with more than 100 violent incidents resulting in over 1,046 fatalities.³

Burkina Faso: Burkina Faso has faced escalating violence since 2015. As of March 31, 2023, the turmoil had forced over 2.06 million people to become internally displaced persons (IDPs), seeking refuge within their own country's borders. This displacement has severely impacted essential services, notably health and education. Numerous health facilities have been affected, hindering access to medical care, while many schools have been forced to close, disrupting the education of countless children.⁴

The political landscape of Burkina Faso has been equally turbulent. In 2022, the country witnessed two military coups that dramatically shifted its governance. The first coup in January ousted President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, signalling deepening unrest. A subsequent coup in

¹ Human Rights Watch. (2023, December 15). *Niger: Events of 2023*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/niger>

² Human Rights Watch. (2023, December 15). *Niger: Events of 2023*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/niger>

³ World Bank. (2021, July 26). *Niger Economic Update: Health and Security Crises Threaten Lives and Livelihoods* [Review of *Niger Economic Update: Health and Security Crises Threaten Lives and Livelihoods*]. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2021/07/26/niger-economic-update-health-and-security-crises-threaten-lives-and-livelihoods>

⁴ The World Bank. (2016). *Overview*. World Bank. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/burkinafaso/overview>

September saw Lieutenant Colonel Paul Henri Sandaogo Damiba overthrown, with Captain Ibrahim Traoré stepping in as the new transitional president.⁵

Mali: Recently, Mali has faced an escalating crisis because of armed insurrection and a fraught political milieu. The complex web of conflict involving Islamist militants, separatists, and the controversial involvement of foreign mercenaries has pushed Mali into a politically unstable situation.⁶ Mali's political landscape has been equally tumultuous. The country has witnessed two military coups in less than a year, both led by Colonel Assimi Goïta, which have plunged the nation into deeper political instability.⁷

While each of these countries faces unique challenges, they all struggle with some political instability and security threats. However, even within these countries, some regions have managed to maintain a degree of stability. For instance, in Mali, the Sikasso Region has managed to maintain peace and stability despite the country's overall volatile situation. This region has implemented strategies to contain land-related conflicts, which are at the heart of inter-communal conflict in Mali⁸.

In light of this, the GCF programme's selection of project sites will prioritize areas where security is relatively stable, and law and order issues are minimal. To inform our approach and ensure a nuanced understanding of each country, we have undertaken a broader categorization of the types of threats and conflicts present in these countries. In total, this report discusses three types of risks, including external risks, internal risks, and community-level risks. Subsequently, this report provides a conflict resolution mechanism for addressing these risks.

⁵ The World Bank. (2016). *Overview*. World Bank.

<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/burkinafaso/overview>

⁶ Kilani, F. (2023, August). Inside Mali: What now for the country that bet its security on Wagner? [Review of *Inside Mali: What now for the country that bet its security on Wagner?*]. BBC.

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66595692>

⁷ Melly, P. (2021, May). Mali coup: How to solve the conundrum [Review of *Mali coup: How to solve the conundrum*]. BBC. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57255601>

⁸ Marquette, C. (2020). Maintaining peace and stability in Mali's Sikasso Region: Strategies to contain land-related conflicts. International Alert

2. External Risks

Identifying external risks is crucial to GCF programme planning, especially in regions with variable security conditions. Once external risks are identified, steps can be taken to mitigate them. This might involve engaging with local stakeholders to address potential external risk issues.

Burkina Faso: Burkina Faso, sharing its borders with six countries, finds itself in a relentless struggle against armed terrorist groups infiltrating from neighbouring territories. The intensity of these attacks is most acute in the northern regions, with the Soum province—nestled beside Mali and Niger.⁹ In fact, Mali and Niger's instability has a spillover effect on Burkina Faso. The Liptako-Gourma region, which borders Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, suffers from an absence of state institutions, competition over natural resources, limited livelihood opportunities, and violent extremism by armed groups¹⁰. This has led to increased activity of armed actors in the 'Three Border' area between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.

At the same time, the instability in Burkina Faso also impacts Mali and Niger. On January 28, 2024, Burkina Faso, along with Niger and Mali, made the unprecedented decision to request withdrawal from ECOWAS.¹¹ This has triggered an array of diplomatic reactions across the region. Furthermore, the creation of a military bloc called the Alliance of Sahel States (AoSS) by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, all currently governed by military regimes, has added another layer of complexity to the situation¹².

Mali: Mali is experiencing escalating violence primarily driven by clashes between non-state armed groups. The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaida-linked group, have been at the forefront of this conflict. Since the start of 2022, the hostilities have forced over 30,000 people to flee to Ménaka in eastern Mali, seeking refuge from the violence.¹³

Niger: Niger grapples with significant security challenges, confronting terrorist threats along different border regions. The vast and sparsely populated desert expanses of the country have become a tactical advantage for terrorist organizations, which exploit these areas for attacks and recruitment. Among the terrorist groups active in Niger are ISIS in the Greater Sahara, Boko Haram, ISIS-WA, and JNIM, making Niger unique for having an ISIS-affiliate presence on three of its borders. In response to the ongoing violence, the Government of Niger has taken legislative action, amending its penal code in 2020 to offer conditional amnesty or mitigated sentences to voluntary

⁹ Savadogo, M. (2020, January 26). *The changing face of Burkina Faso's terrorist threat*. The Conversation. <https://theconversation.com/the-changing-face-of-burkina-fasos-terrorist-threat-130267>

¹⁰ United Nations Sustainable Development Group. (2020, October 20). Communities address root causes of the crisis in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. <https://unsdg.un.org/latest/stories/communities-address-root-causes-crisis-burkina-faso-mali-and-niger>

¹¹ Wong, V. (2023, January). *Ecowas: Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso quit West African bloc* [Review of *Ecowas: Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso quit West African bloc*]. BBC. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68122947>

¹² Global Voices. (2024, February 27). Local reactions to the withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from ECOWAS. <https://globalvoices.org/2024/02/27/local-reactions-to-the-withdrawal-of-burkina-faso-mali-and-niger-from-ecowas/>

¹³ *Situation in Mali Remains Volatile amid Escalating Clashes between Armed Groups, Official Tells Security Council, Calling for Sustained International Engagement* | UN Press. (2023, April 12). [Press.un.org. https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15253.doc.htm](https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15253.doc.htm)

defectors from violent extremist organizations.¹⁴ Despite these efforts and the ongoing battle by Niger's security forces to curb the Islamist insurgency over the past seven years, challenges persist¹⁵.

¹⁴ *Niger*. (n.d.). United States Department of State. <https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/niger/>

¹⁵ Muia, W. (2023, November 3). Niger attack: Jihadists kill dozen of soldiers in deadliest raid since coup [Review of *Niger attack: Jihadists kill dozen of soldiers in deadliest raid since coup*]. *BBC News*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66991696>

3. Internal Risks

Along with external risk, assessing internal risks is crucial for GCF programme planning. In regions with variable security conditions, these considerations are even more critical. The internal risks in these regions may be higher or more unpredictable, making thorough risk assessment and mitigation planning essential.

Burkina Faso: Burkina Faso's struggle with internal security and governance issues has been exacerbated by political instability. The country has experienced six coups since 1966, with the 1987 coup marking a significant turning point that led to the assassination of Captain Thomas Sankara and ushered in President Blaise Compaoré's 27-year authoritarian regime. During this period, the lack of rule of law fostered deep-seated distrust towards the state and its apparatus among the Burkinabe people. Radicalization and violent extremism have also emerged as pressing concerns, particularly in the Sahel and eastern regions. The fall of President Gaddafi in 2011 and the expansion of terrorist groups in the Sahel have also impacted Burkina Faso's security situation.¹⁶

Mali: In Mali, the security situation has deteriorated significantly, with armed Islamist groups launching attacks across various parts of the country. These groups have targeted civilians, soldiers, and international forces alike, with their activities not only persisting in the northern regions but also intensifying in the central areas and expanding into the south.¹⁷ Since January 2023, the northeast of Mali has been particularly affected, witnessing widespread killings, rapes, and lootings of villages by Islamist armed factions. These violent acts have driven thousands from their homes, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in the region.¹⁸

Niger: The security situation in Niger is increasingly threatened by Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs).¹⁹ In the southeastern part of Niger, the presence of two rival factions of Boko Haram—Jamatu Ahli is-Sunnah lid-Dawatai wal-Jihad (JAS) and Islamic State West Africa (ISWAP)—is particularly pronounced.²⁰ Meanwhile, in the western areas bordering Mali and Burkina Faso, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) is active.²¹ The activities of these groups have led to

¹⁶ Institute for Peace and Security Studies. (2020). *BURKINA FASO CONFLICT INSIGHT* [Review of *BURKINA FASO CONFLICT INSIGHT*]. Addis Ababa University. https://ipss-addis.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Burkina-Faso-Conflict-Insights-vol-1-Conflict-Insight-and-Analysis_342020.pdf

¹⁷ Human Rights Watch. (2020, December 18). *World Report 2021: Rights Trends in Mali*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/mali>

¹⁸ *Mali: Mounting Islamist Armed Group Killings, Rape*. (2023, July 13). Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/13/mali-mounting-islamist-armed-group-killings-rape>

¹⁹ Cole, E., & Grossman, A. (2020, November 4). *In Niger, Foreign Security Interests Undermine Stability—What Can Be Done?* [Review of *In Niger, Foreign Security Interests Undermine Stability—What Can Be Done?*]. The United States Institute of Peace. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/11/niger-foreign-security-interests-undermine-stability-what-can-be-done>

²⁰ Cole, E., & Grossman, A. (2020, November 4). *In Niger, Foreign Security Interests Undermine Stability—What Can Be Done?* [Review of *In Niger, Foreign Security Interests Undermine Stability—What Can Be Done?*]. The United States Institute of Peace. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/11/niger-foreign-security-interests-undermine-stability-what-can-be-done>

²¹ Cole, E., & Grossman, A. (2020, November 4). *In Niger, Foreign Security Interests Undermine Stability—What Can Be Done?* [Review of *In Niger, Foreign Security Interests Undermine Stability—What Can Be Done?*]. The United States Institute of Peace.

the displacement of over 200,000 individuals within Niger.²² This mass displacement has, in turn, led to a protracted humanitarian crisis. In response to the escalating violence, the Nigerien government has declared states of emergency in the Diffa and Tillabery regions, highlighting the severity of the threat posed by these VEOs to the country's security and stability.²³

<https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/11/niger-foreign-security-interests-undermine-stability-what-can-be-done>

²² Cole, E., & Grossman, A. (2020, November 4). *In Niger, Foreign Security Interests Undermine Stability—What Can Be Done?* [Review of *In Niger, Foreign Security Interests Undermine Stability—What Can Be Done?*]. The United States Institute of Peace.

<https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/11/niger-foreign-security-interests-undermine-stability-what-can-be-done>

²³ Cole, E., & Grossman, A. (2020, November 4). *In Niger, Foreign Security Interests Undermine Stability—What Can Be Done?* [Review of *In Niger, Foreign Security Interests Undermine Stability—What Can Be Done?*]. The United States Institute of Peace.

<https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/11/niger-foreign-security-interests-undermine-stability-what-can-be-done>

4. Community-Level Risks

Every community has unique characteristics, including cultural norms, socioeconomic conditions, and environmental factors. Understanding these can help identify potential risks impacting the programme's implementation and success. Identifying community-level risks can help in designing strategies for effective community engagement. This is crucial for the programme's sustainability.

Niger: Niger is home to a variety of ethnic groups, including the Hausa, Zarma-Songhai, Tuareg, Fulani, Kanuri, and others²⁴. While contributing to the country's rich cultural diversity, these groups have also been sources of social tension and conflict. Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world²⁵, with a large part of its population dependent on natural resources for their livelihoods. Competition for these scarce resources, such as land and water, often leads to conflicts between ethnic groups. In some cases, historical Socioeconomic inequalities between different ethnic groups often lead to conflicts. For instance, during its colonization of Niger, the French favoured the Zarma/Songhai over other ethnic groups. The Zarma/Songhai, about 20 percent of the population, comprised the educated elite and controlled political power until the National Conference in 1991²⁶. With such Socioeconomic dimensions, groups that feel disadvantaged often lead to violence as a means of expressing their dissatisfaction.

Burkina Faso: In Burkina Faso, pastoralism plays a critical role in the economy, supporting the livelihoods of approximately 50 million people across the Sahel and Sahara fringes. While the Fulani are the predominant pastoralist group, various ethnic groups within Burkina Faso engage in (agro-)pastoralism. Recent years have seen escalating conflicts over pastoral resources in the Sahel, often between sedentary farmers and nomadic pastoralists.²⁷

Mali: Mali is home to various ethnic groups, including the Bambara, Fulani, Tuareg, Dogon, and others. There are some historical socioeconomic inequalities between different ethnic groups of Mali. For instance, during its colonization of Mali, the French favored the southern ethnic groups. Northern ethnic groups received fewer advancement opportunities²⁸. With such socioeconomic dimensions, groups that feel disadvantaged often resort to violence as a means of expressing their dissatisfaction. The Tuareg, for example, have been involved in several rebellions since the country's independence, seeking autonomy for northern Mali²⁹.

²⁴ Oxford Analytica. (2017). Insecurity in Niger may rise. *Emerald Expert Briefings*, (oxan-db).

²⁵ Amouzou, A., Habi, O., & Bensaïd, K. (2012). Reduction in child mortality in Niger: a Countdown to 2015 country case study. *The Lancet*, 380(9848), 1169-1178.

²⁶ Ibrahim, J. (1994). Political exclusion, democratization and dynamics of ethnicity in Niger. *Africa Today*, 41(3), 15-39.

²⁷ Bisson, L., Cottyn, I., Bruijne, K. de, & Molenaar, F. (2021). Between hope and despair Pastoralist adaptation in Burkina Faso [Review of *Between hope and despair Pastoralist adaptation in Burkina Faso*]. In *Clingendael*. Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael".. <https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/between-hope-and-despair.pdf>

²⁸ Smith, C. R. (2014). *National Identity, Military Rule and French Intervention in Mali's Recent Political Crisis*. University of California, Los Angeles.

²⁹ Gaasholt, O. M. (2013). Northern Mali 2012: The short-lived triumph of irredentism. *The Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 35(2).

5. Conflict Resolution Mechanism

Managing external, internal and community level risks is vital for the smooth implementation of this programme, especially in regions characterized by variable security conditions. Ensuring the safety and protection of project staff will be the key priority of the GCF programme. To this end, it is strongly recommended to proactively engage with relevant police departments, commissioner offices, and law enforcement agencies. These partnerships can provide invaluable insights and support, enhancing the programme's security posture. Additionally, developing comprehensive security plans in consultation with these agencies ensures that risk mitigation strategies are robust, tailored to local contexts, and aligned with the best safety and crisis management practices.

Since the recipient countries are home to various ethnic groups, the programme planning process must be equitable and inclusive towards vulnerable groups. This has been the key priority for the project planning team. During the project planning process and through regular field missions (most recently in 2023 and beginning of 2024), different groups were consulted to gather their impressions and feedback. Inclusive project development can help promote social cohesion by ensuring all groups feel valued and included. This can strengthen community bonds and promote peace. To ensure equitable resource mobilization, the programme developed a guideline document on "Blended financing mechanism for climate change adaptation in WAEMU decentralized local and regional authorities (annex 2)". Programmes that are inclusive and equitable are more likely to be sustainable in the long term. When all groups benefit, there is a greater incentive for the community to maintain and support the programme.

To effectively navigate the complex socio-political landscapes of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, this project integrates a **community-focused conflict resolution mechanism**. Rooted in respect for traditional conflict resolution practices, it embraces innovative engagement and mitigation strategies to ensure project success and community support. The aim is to mitigate intervention-related risks that could exacerbate tensions within communities, across ethnic lines, or between communities and government authorities. Particular focus is placed on restoring social cohesion, preventing the escalation of tensions, and enhancing resilience at individual, community, and systemic levels.

The project emphasizes engagement with traditional leaders, tribal elders, and community leaders to ensure culturally sensitive and widely accepted interventions, especially in regions like Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali. These areas are marked by resource tensions, internal displacement, and political upheavals, highlighting the importance of securing community-based consensus and support. To achieve comprehensive inclusivity, the project engages equitably across all societal segments, aiming to prevent the reinforcement of existing rivalries or grievances. The program will navigate political conflict situations by soliciting community insights and leveraging local partner expertise, ensuring actions do not result in unintended adverse outcomes. Engagement considers the limitations within existing community and governance structures, focusing on elevating the voices of the most vulnerable to transform perceptions and realities of community participation. Furthermore, the programme's comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plan (annex 11) will ensure continuous monitoring of project initiatives.

Moreover, the project introduces a coordination mechanism in regions where local government and traditional governance structures overlap to clarify roles, encourage joint planning, and establish shared goals. By emphasizing transparency and collective ownership, the project seeks to ensure harmonious, conflict-free activities and addresses the sensitive issue of resource

distribution. Reflecting the ethnic diversity of communities in its program staff and involving communities in the decision-making process, the project fosters fairness and openness.

Another key innovation is the specialized training for the Project Management Unit (PMU) in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. This prepares the PMU to effectively address and navigate potential conflicts, ensuring project activities fulfil climate resilience goals and contribute to the region's broader peace and stability. Continuous monitoring and supervision align project activities with community needs and expectations, adapting as necessary to changing circumstances. This dynamic approach includes regular consultations to assess community sentiment, facilitating timely adjustments to project strategies. Furthermore, a comprehensive "Do No Harm" analysis at the project's outset and continuous conflict sensitivity analysis throughout implementation will be done to refine programme strategies.

Lastly, security concerns, especially in volatile regions, are addressed through comprehensive risk assessments and the development of a Security Protocol. This protocol will outline practical measures for ensuring the safety of project staff and beneficiaries, adapting to the evolving security situation across the project areas. The Security Protocol will be designed to ensure the safety of project staff and beneficiaries amid the changing security scenarios within these regions. It will encompass a comprehensive set of adaptive measures tailored to pre-emptively address and respond to the diverse security challenges specific to each project locale. Key features will include detailed risk assessments customized to the unique vulnerabilities of each area, advanced security training for project personnel to navigate regional threats and establishment of emergency protocols and communication networks for swift response and efficient information flow.

The programme team will coordinate with community vigilance groups to monitor and pre-empt suspicious activities, enhancing security around project sites. The programme will have local team members for direct engagement with local governance and traditional leaders, ensuring that security measures are effective and culturally attuned and endorsed by the community. Depending on the overall political situation, the programme may hire specialized secured vehicles for some geographical regions and offer insurance to selected field staff members to ensure their safety. In case of any security emergencies, project staff will be relocated to safe regions.

Through such initiatives, the security protocol will aim to provide a coherent and unified strategy that remains flexible and targeted, addressing potential security risks from conflicts in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. This future-focused approach is intended to ensure the safety of programme personnel and foster a sense of security and trust among all stakeholders, thereby supporting the project's sustainability and success in these complex environments. This security protocol will be strictly followed during field visits and other activities.

Overall, integrating these conflict resolution mechanisms is essential for addressing the unique challenges of the target regions. By valuing traditional conflict resolution methods, fostering institutional coordination, engaging communities, training project staff, and ensuring continuous monitoring and security, this project aims to build climate resilience and promote social cohesion and peace. This comprehensive approach is designed to ensure the successful implementation of the project, contributing to the sustainable development and stability of communities facing the dual challenges of climate change and social conflict.

6. Conclusion

Despite the political complexities in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, the LoCAL+ programme can be implemented successfully by prioritizing conflict sensitivity throughout the project cycle. This will involve mitigating potential risks through various strategies:

- **Prioritizing stable regions:** Selecting project sites with minimal security concerns and a history of peacebuilding efforts.
- **Engaging with local stakeholders:** Collaborating with local law enforcement, community leaders, and traditional authorities to understand local dynamics and build trust.
- **Ensuring equitable resource distribution:** Implementing inclusive project development and resource allocation to prevent grievances and foster social cohesion.
- **Employing a community-focused conflict resolution mechanism:** Respecting traditional practices while incorporating innovative approaches to address potential conflicts arising from the project.
- **Implementing a comprehensive security protocol:** Conducting thorough risk assessments, establishing emergency response procedures, and providing security training for project personnel.

By adopting these measures, the LoCAL+ programme can navigate the complexities of the region and contribute to building climate resilience while promoting peace and stability. The continuous monitoring and adaptation of the conflict sensitivity approach will be crucial for the project's long-term success.

The integration of sophisticated conflict resolution mechanisms, rooted in both traditional practices and innovative strategies, is central to the project's conflict resolution approach in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The programme aims to mitigate risks, enhance social cohesion, and build resilience against socio-political challenges by emphasizing engagement with community leaders, fostering inclusivity, and implementing coordinated mechanisms. This strategic focus on conflict resolution is instrumental in ensuring the programme's success, contributing to sustainable development, and promoting peace in these complex and dynamic regions.